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Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) comprises a range of developmental disorders including 
autistic disorder, Asperger’s syndrome, and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise 
specified/atypical autism, each of which is characterised by a triad of impairments in social 
interaction, communication, and restricted, repetitive behaviours and interests (RRBIs) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Health Organization, 1993).  ASD was 
originally identified and described in 1943 by Kanner, who believed the disorder to be 
biologically based.  However, in the following decades, psychosocial explanations for ASD 
began to gain influence.  Most notably, Bettelheim (1967) attributed the development of ASD as 
a response to emotionally “cold” parenting.  Although this theory was influential for a significant 
period of time, it has not received empirical support, and it is now widely agreed that ASD is a 
biologically based disorder.  Twin studies have consistently indicated that ASD is a highly 
heritable disorder (e.g., Bailey et al., 1995; Folstein & Rutter, 1977; Steffenburg, Hellgren, 
Gillberg, Jakobsen, & Bohman, 1989).  Furthermore, although molecular genetic studies have 
not yet established a set of necessary and sufficient genes that cause the disorder, they have 
begun to identify a set of genes that are reliably associated with ASD (International Molecular 
Genetic Study of Autism Consortium, 1998, 2001, 2005).  
 Thus, ASD is a behavioually defined disorder with a biological basis.  The behavioural 
definition and the (presumably forthcoming) identification of a set of genetic or neurobiological 
markers for ASD represent descriptive models of the disorder.  Morton and Frith (1995) have 
argued that in order to develop a causal model of ASD, a third level of explanation – the 
cognitive or psychological level – is necessary to bridge the gap between the biological and 
behavioural levels.  In other words, in order to understand the mechanisms by which genes and 
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neurobiology influence behaviour, it is necessary to understand the cognitive processes that 
mediate that behaviour – there is arguably no direct link between biology and behaviour in ASD.  
For this reason, cognitive accounts are essential to our understanding of the disorder.   
This chapter reviews three of the most influential accounts (as well as some of their 
variants/alternatives) and their respective relationships to brain function and behaviour, in the 
spirit of the causal modeling approach.  We will begin by describing the theory of mind 
hypothesis of ASD – a domain-specific, “social” account – and go on to discuss the executive 
dysfunction and weak central coherence hypotheses – domain-general, broadly “non-social” 
accounts.  Evidence for and against each of the theories will be considered, as well as issues of 
universality, specificity, and relationships to ASD diagnostic features.  The chapter concludes 
with a section considering future directions for cognitive explanations of ASD.       
The Theory of Mind Hypothesis 
According to the original definition, a “theory of mind” (ToM) should be credited to any 
individual who attributes mental states (such as beliefs, desires, and intentions) to self and others 
in order to explain and predict behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  In everyday life, 
attributing mental states to people is a swift, frequently non-conscious activity.  For this reason 
the term “mentalizing”, which places less emphasis on the conscious, deliberate acquisition of 
any theory about the mind, is preferred to the term ToM by some researchers (e.g., Frith, 2003).  
From a cognitive science perspective, the computational underpinnings of ToM/mentalizing are 
complex.  According to Leslie (1987), in the first year and a half of life, typically developing 
infants possess only primary representations of the world.  During these early months, reality 
(objects, people, events, etc.) is represented purely veridically.  At approximately 18 months of 
age, however, infants develop the capacity to form second-order representations that are 
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“decoupled” from reality.  According to Leslie, these representations are no longer of/about the 
world (as primary representations are), but of/about one’s (primary) representation of the world – 
they are representations of representations, or “M-representations” (Leslie & Roth, 1993).  
Because the infant can now represent representations (rather than just reality), they can begin to 
think about other people’s (mental) representations and manipulate their own representations, as 
reflected in the act of pretence, which typically emerges at around 18 months of age.  According 
to Leslie, M-representations are innately specified by a “theory of mind mechanism”, which is 
damaged in ASD.  With a diminished ability to form M-representations, children with ASD are 
limited largely to representing their own and others’ behaviour, but not the mental states that 
underlie behaviour.   
 Intuitively, the ToM theory makes sense of the specific profile of everyday behavior 
characteristically diminished amongst people with ASD, who rarely tell jokes, understand or use 
sarcasm, tell lies or deceive others, or communicate important information to other people.  In 
one way or another, each of these behaviors appears to require the recognition that it is possible 
to hold a mental perspective on reality, which is separate from reality itself.  Likewise, two 
cardinal features of ASD are potentially explained in the same way;  a limited propensity to 
initiate, or respond to, joint attention can be explained by a failure to recognize that other people 
hold a mental perspective that is different from one’s own (Leslie & Happé, 1989).  Also, the 
fact that children with ASD tend not to understand pretend play in others, or engage in pretend 
play themselves, can be explained by a limited ability to form M-representations.  For example, 
to understand that a banana can be used as a telephone (or anything else) during pretend play 
arguably requires the ability to recognize the distinction between reality (that the banana is a 
banana) and one’s own and others’ pretend representations of reality (Leslie, 1987).  From a 
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clinical perspective, then, the ToM theory of ASD parsimoniously explains many of the social 
and communicative difficulties that are core features of ASD. 
Evidence for the ToM hypothesis 
This version of the ToM hypothesis of ASD has the advantage of being very well 
specified and providing clear, testable predictions as to what kinds of activity and understanding 
children with ASD show limitations.  Specific empirical evidence for the hypothesis came from a 
series of landmark studies, beginning in the mid-1980s, which found that children with ASD had 
significant difficulties with recognising that other people can hold false beliefs about the world.  
For example, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) gave children with and without ASD a 
“location change” false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) in which a scenario is presented 
where one character, Sally, places her marble in a basket, and then leaves the vicinity.  While 
Sally is out of sight, another character, “naughty Anne” removes the marble from the basket and 
places it in a nearby box.  Participants were then asked a ToM test question regarding which 
location Sally will look for her marble when she returns to collect it.  A correct answer requires 
the participant to recognise that Sally will act on the basis of her belief (that the marble is in the 
basket), rather than reality (that the marble is in the box).  Strikingly, Baron-Cohen et al. found 
that 80% of the children with ASD failed this question, despite the fact that, on average, they had 
a mental age of 5.5 years, which is 1.5 years higher than the age at which typically developing 
children reliably pass false belief tasks  (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  The fact that 
participants with ASD succeeded on a number of carefully designed control tasks ensured that 
failure on the ToM test question was not merely the result of difficulties with memory or general 
logical reasoning.  Children with ASD seemed to have a specific problem with recognising 
mental states, as the ToM theory predicted would be the case.   
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Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) study formed the cornerstone for a further two decades of 
research into ToM in ASD, which has consistently revealed deficits in the ability of affected 
individuals to explicitly understand a variety of mental states, including beliefs (Happé, 1995), 
intentions (Williams & Happé, 2009a), knowledge and ignorance (Lind & Bowler, 2009b), and 
deception (Sodian & Frith, 1992) in others, or in self (see Williams, Lind, & Happé, 2009).  For 
example, in one experiment, Sodian and Frith asked children to keep a piece of candy safe by 
placing it in an opaque box.  The children were then introduced to two puppets – a “nasty 
thieving wolf” and a “nice friendly seal”.  The participants’ task was to prevent the wolf from 
getting the candy, since he would steal it.  Instead, the children had to ensure that the seal found 
the candy so that they received a reward of two pieces of candy.  In one condition, participants 
could achieve these goals by lying to the wolf and telling him that the box did not contain candy, 
but telling the seal the truth about the contents of the box.  In this “deception” condition, for the 
child to achieve their goals they needed to induce a false belief in the wolf, which clearly 
requires a ToM.  In another condition, participants could achieve their goals by physically 
locking the box whenever the wolf appeared, but simply leaving the box unlocked whenever the 
seal appeared.  In this “sabotage” condition, participants only needed to understand a chain of 
physical causation; locking the box prevented a puppet from getting the candy, whereas leaving 
the box unlocked allowed the puppet to obtain the contents.  Sodian and Frith found that whereas 
all participants, including those with ASD, performed very well in the sabotage condition, 
children with ASD were unique in performing poorly in the deception condition, highlighting the 
specificity of the mentalizing deficits in ASD.   
The ToM theory has also received support from neurobiological studies, which have 
identified a “core ToM network” of brain regions amongst typically developing children.  Areas 
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of the brain reliably recruited specifically for the purpose of solving ToM tasks include the 
medial prefrontal cortex and orbitofrontal region, anterior- and paracingulate cortices, superior 
temporal sulcus, and temporoparietal junction (e.g., Gallagher et al., 2000).  Indeed, in a recent 
meta-analysis focusing on neurobiological studies of ToM in typical development, the medial 
prefrontal cortex was associated with ToM task performance in 37/40 studies (Carrington & 
Bailey, 2009).  Supporting the ToM theory of ASD, several studies have now shown that this 
core ToM network – particularly the medial prefrontal cortex – is under-activated amongst 
individuals with ASD during ToM tasks (e.g., Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002; Kana, 
Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2009; see also Zilbovicius et al., 2006).  At a minimum, 
these studies confirm that ToM difficulties in ASD are associated consistently with specific 
neurobiological abnormalities.  However, it is important to note that these findings do not 
necessarily indicate that the neural basis of ToM impairments in ASD has been uncovered.  The 
brain regions that comprise the core ToM network have a protracted development amongst 
typically developing individuals, not reaching full maturity until late adolescence, or early 
adulthood (see Dumontheil, Burgess, & Blakemore, 2008).  As such, it may be that these regions 
become specialized for mentalizing, rather than being “pre-wired” for such a function as Leslie’s 
1987 theory might predict.   
Challenges to the ToM hypothesis 
Despite the fact that the ToM theory of ASD has intuitive appeal and is supported by a 
significant body of empirical evidence from both cognitive and neurobiological studies, it has 
been challenged in several ways in recent years.  The first challenge to the theory concerns the 
universality of the ToM impairment in ASD.  Even from the earliest cognitive studies of ToM, it 
was clear that not all children with ASD failed traditional ToM tasks.  In a meta-analysis of 13 
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studies of false belief understanding in ASD, Happé (1995) found participant success rates 
ranged from 16.6% to 60%.  Across studies, 17 out of 70 (20%) children with ASD passed all 
false belief test questions.  This compared with 20 out of 34 (58.8%) participants with moderate 
learning disability (MLD), who did not have ASD.  Clearly, on a strong version of the ToM 
hypothesis, if an impairment in ToM is the underlying cognitive cause of the social-
communicative features of ASD, then impairments on false belief tasks should be universal in 
ASD, assuming these tasks are valid measures of ToM.   
Additionally, some have claimed that a further problem for the ToM hypothesis concerns 
the diagnostic specificity of the ToM impairment in ASD.  Several studies have now shown that 
a proportion of children with other disorders manifest difficulties on traditional measures of 
ToM.  Hence, children with congenital deafness who are born to hearing parents show 
diminished performance on false belief tasks (e.g., Peterson & Seigal, 1995), as do children with 
congenital blindness (e.g., Peterson, Peterson, & Webb, 2000), or generalized intellectual 
disability (Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998).  The fact that children with 
developmental disorders other than ASD show impaired ToM task performance, but generally 
not the social-communicative difficulties associated with ASD, presents an additional challenge 
to the ToM account of ASD.   
Although the issues of universality and diagnostic specificity are apparent challenges to 
the ToM account of ASD, we are not inclined to view them as particularly persuasive ones.  In 
our view, as highlighted above, it is essential to distinguish surface level behaviour (in this case, 
task performance) from the cognitive underpinnings of behaviour.  The same behaviour may 
have different underlying cognitive causes in different disorders (Morton & Frith, 1995).  In 
particular, several researchers have argued that, whereas children with ASD fail traditional false 
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belief tasks because they have diminished ToM competence as a result of a faulty underlying 
cognitive mechanism, children without ASD fail such tasks because of extraneous (performance) 
factors.  In other words, children without ASD possess the basic underlying cognitive 
mechanism responsible for ToM, but fail to utilize this mechanism appropriately during ToM 
tasks.   One way to test whether poor task performance has the same underlying cognitive cause 
across disorders is to manipulate the task of interest in systematic ways and investigate whether 
the manipulations affect performance in a comparable way in each disorder.  If the underlying 
causes of ToM task success and failure are different amongst individuals with ASD than amongst 
children without ASD, then the issues of universality and diagnostic specificity do not provide 
strong challenges to the ToM account of ASD.  
Adopting this approach, several studies have indicated that, in fact, different 
manipulations to false belief tasks affect the performance of children with different disorders in 
different ways.  For example, Surian and Leslie (1999) found that asking children with ASD 
where Sally would look for her marble first (as opposed to merely asking where she would look) 
on a location change false belief task made no difference to their task performance.  By contrast, 
this manipulation significantly increased the performance of typically developing 3-year-olds, as 
it also did in a study by Siegal and Beatie (1991).  Conversely, Williams and Happé (2009b) 
found that if children with ASD were not allowed to verbalise their own false belief in an 
“unexpected contents” false belief task (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986), then their 
performance on the subsequent “self test question” (which assessed awareness of own false 
beliefs) was significantly poorer than their performance on the “other-person test question”, 
which assesses awareness of another person’s false belief.  In contrast, parallel performance 
across the self and other-person test questions was observed amongst both children with 
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intellectual disability and young typically developing children, regardless of whether or not they 
verbalised their own false belief.   Furthermore, Peterson, Wellman and Liu (2005) found that 
children with ASD were unique in finding false belief tasks significantly more difficult than a 
task requiring the identification of a hidden emotion (e.g., in an individual who pretends not to 
be embarrassed, when they really are).  Both typically developing and congenitally deaf children 
showed the opposite pattern of performance, finding it more difficult to identify a hidden 
emotion than a false belief. 
These studies suggest that the underlying cognitive causes of false belief task failure 
amongst children with ASD are somewhat different to the causes underlying task failure amongst 
children without ASD.  As such, the issue of diagnostic specificity of diminished ToM task 
performance is not such a challenge to the ToM account of ASD.  Conversely, other studies 
suggest that success on traditional ToM tasks also has different causes in children with and 
without ASD.  Several studies have observed a close connection between verbal ability and 
success on traditional false belief tasks.   In particular, grammatical knowledge appears strongly 
tied to successful performance amongst children with ASD, but significantly less so (Fisher, 
Happé, & Dunn, 2005), or not at all (Lind & Bowler, 2009a) amongst children with intellectual 
disability.  This has led to the claim that children with ASD employ compensatory strategies to 
“hack out” solutions to ToM tasks in the absence of true ToM competence (Bowler, 1992; 
Happé, 1995).  Supporting this possibility, Senju, Southgate, White, and Frith (2009) found that 
adults with ASD who pass traditional, explicit false belief tasks nonetheless perform atypically 
on a measure of implicit ToM that requires attention to be spontaneously deployed on the basis 
of another person’s mental state.  This suggests that explicit knowledge of mental states amongst 
verbally able individuals with ASD has been acquired in an atypical fashion and not primarily 
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via the ToM mechanism.  As such, the finding that some individuals with ASD perform well on 
traditional ToM tasks does not necessarily challenge the ToM account. 
A third challenge to the ToM account concerns the fact that evidence for a direct link 
between ToM task performance and severity of clinical features in ASD is somewhat mixed.  In 
two studies of general adaptive behavior amongst individuals with ASD, significant differences 
in specific aspects of social behavior were observed between those individuals who passed ToM 
tasks and those who did not (see Fombonne, Siddons, Achard, Frith, & Happé, 1994; Frith, 
Happé, & Siddons, 1994).  Frith et al. interviewed parents about their children with ASD using, 
amongst other measures, an “Active and Interactive Sociability Scale”.  The Active Sociability 
subscale consisted of questions concerning social skills that were not thought to rely on 
mentalizing (e.g., saying “please” when requesting something; playing board games).  The 
Interactive Sociability subscale consisted of questions concerning social skills that were thought 
to rely on mentalizing (e.g., keeping secrets; apologising for hurting another’s feelings).  In 
addition, the children with ASD, themselves, were given two standard false belief tasks.  Frith et 
al. found that while there were no differences on the Active Sociability subscale between ToM 
passers and ToM failers, differences were observed on the Interactive Sociability subscale.  
Hence, on average, children who passed the false belief tasks were rated as showing superior 
interactive social skills than children who failed the false belief tasks.  This supports the ToM 
account.  However, Frith et al. also found that the real life social skills of a significant proportion 
of children in the study could not be distinguished by false belief task performance.  Hence, a 
number of children who passed the false belief tasks nonetheless displayed diminished 
interactive social skills, suggesting that ToM is not closely related to severity of clinical features.   
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Frith et al.’s (1994) results were replicated and extended by Fombonne et al. (1994), 
providing only partial support for the ToM account.  However, caution needs to be taken when 
drawing absolute conclusions from these studies.  As highlighted above, some individuals with 
ASD may well hack out solutions to traditional ToM tasks, using intellectual strategies.  
Therefore, performance on false belief tasks may not relate to severity of social-communication 
deficits amongst individuals with ASD because performance on the false belief tasks may not 
always tap true ToM competence.  It is essential that future studies of the relation between ToM 
and feature severity in ASD employ implicit measures of mentalizing ability, the solutions to 
which are not easily hacked out by explicit problem-solving strategies (e.g., Senju et al., 2009).  
For the ToM account of ASD to be plausible, a relation must be observed between implicit 
awareness of mental states on these tasks and severity of social-communication impairments in 
ASD.   
Even if the ToM account can ultimately explain the social-communication deficits in 
ASD, it is less likely to explain adequately the repetitive and stereotyped behaviors and interests 
that characterize the disorder.  Although repetitive behaviors and interests could be considered a 
reaction to anxiety and confusion caused by social incomprehension (caused ultimately by a 
ToM deficit; see Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2008), Turner (1999) has argued that this is unlikely 
to be the case.  As she points out, repetitive behaviours have both an arousing, as well as a 
calming, function amongst many individuals with ASD.  Thus, they are unlikely to be merely a 
coping strategy employed to deal with social-communication problems.   As such, it seems that 
the ToM account may not be able to explain fully the whole range of clinical features in ASD. 
Alternatives to the ToM hypothesis 
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Arguably, one of the most significant challenges to the ToM account of ASD is to explain 
those core social features of ASD that do not obviously require the high-level representation of 
mental states.  Manifestations of primary inter-subjectivity, such as social smiling, social 
orienting, and the maintenance of eye contact – all of which are diminished in ASD – do not 
seem to require high level mentalizing.  Rather, one might intuitively suppose that difficulties 
with spontaneous orienting to and establishing co-ordination with others are related to, or 
perhaps even underpin, difficulties with representing mental states in people.  Indeed, Hobson 
(1989, 1993, 2002) has argued persuasively that difficulties with establishing and maintaining 
affective engagement with others leads to, rather than results from, a diminished ToM (related, 
but subtly different, accounts are provided by Loveland, 1991, and Klin, Jones, Schultz, & 
Volkmar, 2003).  Hobson suggests that in typical development, young infants have a 
biologically-based predisposition to “identify” with the bodily-expressed stances and attitudes of 
others.  For example, even from the earliest weeks of life, infants have been shown to coordinate 
their own feelings closely with those of others (Haviland & Lelwica, 1987).  According to 
Hobson, it is through this (pre-conceptual, initially non-representational) process of being 
continually moved between different perspectives throughout early development that leads 
typically developing children to eventually recognise the distinction between perspective and 
reality (i.e., develop a ToM).  According to Hobson, the diagnostic deficits in social-
communication in ASD, as well as the characteristic deficits in ToM, are a consequence of an 
innately reduced propensity to identify with others.   
 Hobson’s (1989, 1993, 2002) theory shares characteristics with the ToM account of ASD.  
It is “domain-specific”, in that it places social deficits at the core of the disorder, and it 
emphasises children’s difficulty with representing mental states as a cause of the characteristic 
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features of the disorder (e.g., deficits in pretend play).  Arguably, however, it has the advantage 
of being able to account, in principal, for difficulties with primary inter-subjectivity, as well as 
with ToM, amongst people with ASD.  Hobson’s theory has not gone unchallenged by ToM 
theorists, however, who have argued that his theory fails to account for exactly how concepts of 
mind emerge from the pre-conceptual process of identification (see Leslie & Frith, 1990; 
Hobson, 2002, pp.255-260).  Also, like the ToM account, Hobson’s theory has difficulty 
explaining the apparently “non-social” repetitive behaviours and interests that characterize ASD.  
To explain these deficits, alternative cognitive accounts may be necessary.   
The Executive Dysfunction Hypothesis 
Although the definition of executive function is hotly debated (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007), 
the term is commonly used to refer to a broad range of high-level cognitive functions, primarily 
underpinned by the frontal lobes (Stuss et al., 2002), such as planning, cognitive flexibility/set 
shifting, inhibitory control, working memory, and generativity (Hill, 2004).  Neuropsychological 
patients with specific damage to the frontal lobes show inflexibility of cognition and behavior 
that is reminiscent of that observed amongst individuals with ASD.  This led to an early 
hypothesis that executive functions would be impaired in ASD and that this impairment could 
underpin the behavioral features of the disorder (e.g., Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994; 
Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996).   
The executive dysfunction hypothesis makes intuitive sense of the restricted, repetitive, 
and stereotyped patterns of behaviour in ASD.  A difficulty in generating, planning, and 
controlling behavior would likely result in a tendency to engage in only a limited number of 
activities that would be repeated over and over again, with limited imagination or variation (e.g., 
Turner, 1999).  The theory also has the potential to explain deficits in joint attention associated 
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with ASD.  Joint attention requires the disengagement of attention from one’s current focus and a 
shifting of attention to the object or event in the world that is the focus of another person’s 
attention.  As such, joint attention deficits in ASD might result from executive difficulties with 
set-shifting/cognitive flexibility (e.g., McEvoy, Rogers, & Pennington, 1993), rather than a 
failure to recognize mental states in others (e.g., Leslie & Happé, 1989).  In a similar vein, some 
researchers have argued that deficits in pretend play are most parsimoniously explained by a 
limited ability to generate pretend scenarios (Jarrold, 2003), rather than an inability to form M-
representations, as the ToM hypothesis suggests (Leslie, 1987).  Some theorists have gone 
further than this, however, and suggested that executive dysfunction could have cascading effects 
that result in the full range of social-communication deficits, as well as repetitive behaviours, in 
ASD.   
Arguably the most theoretically-developed executive dysfunction account of ASD was 
provided by Russell (e.g., 1996).  According to Russell, the most basic executive function is the 
ability to monitor one’s actions.  Russell and Hill (2001, p.317) define action monitoring as, “the 
mechanisms that ensure that agents know, without self-observation, (a) for which changes in 
perceptual input they are responsible and (b) what they are currently engaged in doing”.  
Therefore, effective action monitoring allows an individual to distinguish between ‘self-caused’ 
and ‘world-caused’ changes in experience and hence, in Russell’s (1996) theory, gives rise to an 
experience of agency.  This “sub-personal”, non-conscious process, which is a pre-requisite for 
all other (higher) components of executive functioning (e.g., planning), is thought to involve 
generating a visual (‘efference’) copy of a motor intention for action and then monitoring this 
copy in relation to the sensory consequences of one’s action (e.g., Wolpert, Ghahramani, & 
Jordan, 1995).  According to Russell, a primary deficit in action monitoring results in a failure to 
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develop higher forms of executive functioning, which contributes to repetitive behaviors and 
interests in ASD.  More importantly, in Russell’s theory a deficit in action monitoring leads to a 
failure amongst individuals with ASD to experience their agency.  As a developmental 
consequence, infants with ASD fail to recognize others as agents (with mental states), which 
directly causes their diagnostic social-communication impairments.   
Evidence for the executive dysfunction hypothesis 
Consistent with the executive dysfunction theory, several higher components of executive 
functioning have been shown to be diminished in ASD.  For instance, planning ability is assessed 
most frequently using the Tower of London task (Shallice, 1982).  This task involves moving 
beads across pegs from an initial starting position to match a particular specified end-state in as 
few moves as possible.  Several studies have shown that individuals with ASD perform less well 
than matched comparison participants on this task, requiring a greater number of moves to 
complete the puzzle (e.g., Bennetto, Pennington, & Rogers, 1996; Ozonoff, Pennington, & 
Rogers, 1991; Pellicano, 2007). 
Another component of executive functioning that appears reliably impaired amongst 
individuals with ASD is cognitive flexibility, which is traditionally assessed using the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST) (Heaton, 1981).  In this test, participants are presented with four 
stimulus picture cards depicting (a) one red triangle, (b) two green stars, (c) three yellow crosses, 
and (4) four blue circles, respectively, as well as a deck of response picture cards that vary on the 
dimensions of number, colour, and shape.  The participant is required to match the response 
cards to one of the stimulus cards according to one dimension specified by a particular unspoken 
rule (e.g., match according to colour).  Although the experimenter does not explicitly state the 
sorting rule, she/he provides corrective feedback for each of the participant’s card placements.  
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On the basis of this feedback, the participant must deduce the nature of the rule.  Once the 
participant has provided 10 consecutive correct responses, unbeknownst to him/her, the 
experimenter changes the unspoken rule.  Thus, in order to continue providing correct responses 
s/he must flexibly shift to the new rule (e.g., sort according to number).  Individuals with ASD 
typically show significantly more perseverative errors on the WCST (e.g., Ambery, Russell, 
Perry, Morris, & Murphy, 2006; Dichter & Belger, 2007; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; 
Rumsey, 1985).  Such findings are generally taken as evidence for impaired set 
shifting/cognitive flexibility in ASD.  However, it is also possible that difficulties with other 
components of executive functioning, such as working memory and/or inhibition contribute to 
such perseveration.   
Inhibitory control refers to “the ability to suppress the activation, processing, or 
expression of information that would otherwise interfere with the efficient attainment of a 
cognitive or behavioral goal” (Christ, Holt, White, & Green, 2007, p.1156).  In ASD, it has been 
most commonly assessed using Stroop (Stroop, 1935) and Go/No-Go (Drewe, 1975) tasks.  
Standard Stroop tasks require participants to identify the color of the ink in which stimulus 
words are presented.  In the key inhibitory control condition, the stimulus words are colour 
names printed in incongruent ink colours (e.g., “red” displayed in green font).  In order to 
successfully name the colour of the ink, the participant must inhibit the automatic behavior of 
simply reading the word.  Studies have overwhelmingly shown intact Stroop performance in 
ASD (e.g., Ambery, Russell, Perry, Morris, & Murphy, 2006), notably, even when participants 
with ASD have significantly lower IQs than typical comparison participants (e.g., Christ, Holt, 
White, & Green, 2007; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999).   
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In Go/No-Go tasks, participants are repeatedly presented with two different stimuli (e.g., 
a square and a circle), one at a time, in a random order, and asked to respond to only one of them 
(e.g., by pressing the spacebar).  Hence, they might be asked to press the spacebar when they see 
a square (Go trials) but not when they see a circle (No-Go trials).  Hence, on the No-Go trials 
they must inhibit their motor response.  Thus, the key variable of interest is the commission error 
rate on No-Go trials.  The majority of studies employing well matched groups suggest 
unimpaired performance amongst individuals with ASD (e.g., Geurts, Begeer, & Stockmann, 
2009; Happé, Booth, Charlton, & Hughes, 2006; Schmitz et al., 2006).  Despite the fact that 
individuals with ASD have few difficulties on classic test of inhibition such as the Stroop and 
Go/No-Go tasks, they  show impairments on tasks which require the inhibition of prepotent 
responses (Hill, 2004).  For example, Hughes and Russell (1993) assessed this type of inhibition 
using a “detour reaching task”, which involved retrieving a marble from a platform inside a box.  
Reaching directly for the marble caused an infrared light beam to be broken resulting in the 
marble dropping through a trapdoor, rendering it inaccessible.  Therefore, to perform 
successfully on the task, the participant had to inhibit this prepotent response. Instead, they 
needed to either flick a switch on the side of box in order to turn off the beam of light and then 
directly pick up the marble, or turn a knob that caused the marble descend down a chute from 
which they could safely retrieve it.  It was found that participants with ASD were significantly 
impaired on this task, finding it difficult to inhibit the urge to reach directly for the marble.   
Working memory is another executive function that has been the focus of many studies of 
ASD.  Working memory is a term used to refer to “a limited capacity system allowing the 
temporary storage and manipulation of information” (Baddeley, 2000, p.418). Working memory 
can be measured using “n-back” tasks, which involve both the short-term storage and 
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manipulation of information.  Here, participants are asked to monitor a continuous sequence of 
stimuli (e.g., letters) and respond when the presented stimulus matches one presented n trials 
previously, where n is typically pre-specified as 1, 2, or 3 (Owen, McMillan, & Laird, 2005).  
Studies involving zero-back (where the target is the first item in the stimulus sequence), one-
back, and two-back conditions have shown that individuals with ASD are unimpaired (Koshino 
et al., 2005; Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001; Williams, Goldstein, Carpenter, & Minshew, 2005).  
However, ceiling effects may have obscured possible group differences in these studies – the 
error rate was very low in each case.  Indeed, it should be noted that the zero-, one-, and two-
back conditions used in each of these experiments may have lacked the sensitivity needed to 
detect possible group differences in working memory - in other words the tasks were not taxing 
enough to reveal group differences if present.  Indeed, Hockey and Geffen (2004) have argued 
that n-back tasks only involve a significant working memory load when n equals three or more.   
Computerised box search tasks, such as the spatial working memory task from the  
Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (Cambridge Cognition, 1996), have also 
been used to assess working memory in ASD.   In this type of task, participants must search 
through an array of boxes in order to retrieve hidden tokens.  Importantly, they are asked to 
avoid opening boxes that they have already searched – tokens never appear in the same box more 
than once.  They key dependent measure in such tasks is the number of search errors in which 
participants re-search an already searched box for a particular target token.  The majority of 
studies indicate that individuals with ASD show significantly more search errors than age and IQ 
matched comparison individuals (Landa & Goldberg, 2005; Steele, Minshew, Luna, & Sweeney, 
2007; Sinzig, Morsche, Bruning, Schmidt, & Lehmkuhl, 2008; but see Edgin & Pennington, 
2005; and Happé, Booth, Charlton, & Hughes, 2006).  Consistent with the suggestion made 
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above, in relation to methodological weaknesses in n-back studies, Steele et al. (2007) found that 
ASD-specific working memory impairments were load-dependent, such that difficulties only 
began to emerge in high load conditions.  Thus, the evidence regarding working memory in ASD 
is equivocal – some studies find impairments, others do not.  Further research using more 
demanding tasks will be required to resolve the debate. 
It should be clear from this brief review of the literature that ASD does not involve 
blanket executive function deficits – some aspects appear to be impaired whilst others appear to 
be intact, and results are variable across studies.  But what is the neural basis of those deficits 
that are present?  Since the late 1970s, it has been hypothesized that specific abnormalities within 
the frontal lobes have a causal role in ASD (Damasio & Maurer, 1978) and such hypothesized 
abnormalities could potentially account for executive dysfunction.  Indeed, a number of 
functional neuroimaging studies have indicated functional abnormalities within the frontal lobes 
of individuals with ASD during executive tasks (Di Martino et al., 2009).  Unfortunately, many 
of these studies are not able to directly address the question of whether frontal lobe dysfunction 
underlies executive dysfunction in ASD.  A number of investigations have demonstrated 
different levels and patterns of neural activity during executive task performance amongst 
individuals with ASD but this is alongside intact behavioural performance on those executive 
tasks (e.g., Gilbert, Bird, Brindleya, Frith, & Burgess, 2008; Kana et al., 2007; Koshino et al., 
2005; Schmitz et al., 2006).  Whilst such findings are interesting in their own right, they tell us 
little about the neural basis of executive function impairments.  However, at least two functional 
imagining studies have established functional abnormalities in the presence of behavioural 
impairments.  For example, Luna et al. (2002) found that individuals with ASD showed reduced 
levels of activation within the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex during 
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a spatial working memory task.  Furthermore, Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, and Minshew 
(2007) observed similar levels of activation between participants with and without ASD but 
reduced functional connectivity between frontal and parietal areas during the Tower of London 
planning task.  Findings such as these provide a plausible explanation for why some individuals 
with ASD experience executive dysfunction.  However, in order to further clarify these issues, it 
will be important for imaging researchers to carefully select behavioral paradigms that are 
robustly found to be problematic for individuals with ASD. 
One significant strength of the executive dysfunction hypothesis is that it potentially 
explains the RRBIs that characterize ASD.  Although there have been some negative or mixed 
findings (e.g., Dicher et al., 2009; South, Ozonoff, & McMahon, 2007), a number of studies have 
reported significant correlations between executive dysfunction and level of RRBIs.  For 
example, Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, and Lai (2005) found that cognitive flexibility, working 
memory, and inhibition (but not planning or fluency) were significantly related to RRBIs.  In 
another study, Boyd, McBee, Holtsclaw, Baranek, and Bodfish (2009) assessed the relationship 
between executive dysfunction and repetitive behaviours using the Behavior Rating Inventory of 
Executive Function (BRIEF) (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000) and the Repetitive 
Behavior Scale-Revised (RBS-R) (Bodfish, Symons, & Lewis, 1999; Lam & Aman, 2007).  The 
BRIEF is a questionnaire that yields both a composite score and two separate indices: Behavioral 
Regulation (subscales: inhibition, shifting attention, and emotional control) and Metacognition 
(subscales: initiating, working memory, planning/organizing, organization of materials, and 
monitoring).  The RBS-R is a questionnaire that assesses various repetitive behaviours across six 
subscales (stereotypy, self-injurious behavior, compulsions, rituals, sameness and restricted 
interests).  Boyd et al. found that RBS-R total score was significantly correlated with the BRIEF 
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Behaviour Regulation score but not BRIEF Metacognition or Composite scores.  These findings 
suggest that the executive dysfunction theory offers a credible explanation for at least some of 
the clinical features of ASD.     
Challenges to the executive dysfunction hypothesis 
Despite the evidence discussed in support of the executive dysfunction account, several 
challenges have been made to the account in recent years.  Firstly, although some higher-order 
components of executive functioning are impaired in ASD, basic action monitoring skills appear 
to be preserved, contrary to Russell’s (1996) central claim.  Williams and Happé (2009c) 
explored action monitoring amongst children with autism, using a task adapted from Russell and 
Hill (2001).  In this task, participants needed to judge which one of several colored squares on a 
computer screen was under their intentional control (through movements of the mouse) and 
which ‘distractor’ squares were under the control of the computer.  So, although all of the 
squares on the screen were activated when the mouse was moved, only one of the squares 
behaved directly in accordance with the participant’s movements.  The movements of the other 
squares were randomly generated by the computer.  Ensuring that participants could not solve 
the task by visually comparing the movements of their hand with the movements of the squares 
on the screen (i.e., through self-observation), their hand was located inside a box while they 
moved the mouse.  Therefore, to recognize the square that they were controlling, participants 
needed to monitor accurately an efference copy of their motor command and compare this to the 
visual input from the computer screen (i.e., to detect their own agency).  Williams and Happé 
found that adolescents with ASD performed well on this task and not significantly differently 
from closely-matched comparison participants.  Moreover, Williams (in press) confirmed that 
participants with ASD in Williams and Happé’s study showed significantly diminished ToM.  
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Therefore, there was no evidence either that action monitoring was impaired in ASD, or that 
awareness of one’s own agency resulting from action monitoring is sufficient to recognize others 
as agents with mental states (see also David et al., 2008; Frith & Hermelin, 1969).  
 Although these findings provide strong evidence against Russell’s (1996) version of the 
executive dysfunction account of ASD, they do not necessarily show that impairments in other 
components of executive functioning are not a primary cognitive deficit in ASD.  This latter 
suggestion is challenged by other findings, however.  Firstly, although diminished cognitive 
flexibility/set-shifting, inhibition of a prepotent response, and working memory (see above) have 
been observed in children with ASD from around 5.5 years of age (e.g., Dawson, Meltzoff, 
Osterling, & Rinaldi, 1998; McEvoy, Rogers, & Pennington, 1993), studies of younger children 
with ASD have failed to find evidence of deficits in any of these areas.  In studies by Dawson et 
al. (2002) and Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, and Rogers (1999), children with ASD between the 
ages of 3 and 5 years were tested on a variety of executive functioning tasks that are suitable for 
young children and on which impairments are seen in monkeys with lesions to the prefrontal 
cortex (e.g., Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989).  In particular, in contrast to studies involving 
older children with ASD, no differences were seen between children with and without ASD on a 
Spatial Reversal task (assessing cognitive flexibility and inhibition of a prepotent response), the 
A not B task (assessing working memory and inhibition of a prepotent response), or Boxes tasks 
(assessing working memory).   
 These findings amongst young, preschool children with ASD cast doubt on the 
hypothesis that impairments in (at least these components of) executive functioning represent a 
primary cognitive deficit in ASD.  Arguably, a parsimonious interpretation is that executive 
dysfunction emerges with age in ASD and is a secondary consequence of other deficits in this 
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disorder.  Establishing this possibility will, ultimately, require longitudinal studies of executive 
functioning in ASD, using a variety of measures that are sensitive to executive dysfunction.   
 Consideration of universality and specificity is also pertinent when evaluating the 
executive dysfunction hypothesis.  With regard to universality, it is clear that results are mixed, 
with many studies obtaining null results.  Even within those studies that have found executive 
difficulties on the group level, there is still considerable variability within the groups.  For 
example, Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, and Maley (2006) found that only 48% of children with 
ASD fell at least one standard deviation below the mean of the comparison group on the Tower 
of London planning task, and only 55% on a set-shifting task similar to the WCST.  It should 
also be noted that executive dysfunction is certainly not specific to ASD – it is common in other 
disorders such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and Tourette syndrome, which 
involve a very different set of behavioural impairments to those seen in ASD.  However, what 
may prove to be specific to ASD is the executive dysfunction profile that characterizes the 
disorder (Happé, Booth, Charlton, & Hughes, 2006; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999). 
The Weak Central Coherence Hypothesis 
The weak central coherence hypothesis of autism was originally proposed by Frith (1989, 
2003).  The hypothesis draws on ideas from gestalt psychology and assumes that whilst typically 
developing individuals have “a built-in propensity to form coherence over as wide a range of 
stimuli as possible, and to generalize over as wide a range of contexts as possible” (Frith, 2003, 
pp.159-160), individuals with ASD have a diminution in this propensity.  Metaphorically, 
according to Frith’s original weak central coherence account, children with ASD are unable to 
“see the wood for the trees”.  Weak central coherence was originally conceptualized as a core 
deficit in extracting meaning and processing wholes.  However, more recent versions of the 
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theory have adopted the idea that weak central coherence is a “cognitive style” rather than a 
cognitive deficit (Happé, 1999).  According to this view, individuals can fall anywhere on the 
continuum of central coherence, ranging from preferential processing of parts – local bias – to 
preferential processing of wholes – global bias.  Thus, individuals with ASD tend to show a 
cognitive style that falls towards the “local” end of the continuum.   
Weak central coherence was originally thought to contribute to the social features of 
ASD and Frith (1989) hypothesised that weak central coherence may underlie ToM impairments 
in the disorder.  However, more recent versions of the theory have retracted from this argument; 
instead focusing on the theory’s potential to account for non-social features and perceptual 
anomalies (Happé & Frith, 2006).  For example, the hypothesis is consistent with Kanner’s 
(1943) early observation that individuals with autism show an “inability to experience wholes 
without full attention to the constituent parts” (p.246), and clinical observations that children 
with autism tend to be pre-occupied with parts of objects (e.g., spinning the wheels on toy cars) 
and show increased sensitivity to minute changes in the environment.   
Evidence for the weak central coherence hypothesis  
Although there are a number of contradictory findings, several sources of evidence 
suggest that individuals with ASD show superior performance when tasks depend on processing 
of local features but inferior performance when tasks depend on processing of global features, 
providing support for the weak central coherence hypothesis (see Happé & Frith, 2006, for a 
recent review).  Studies of block design represent one particularly compelling source of evidence 
for the hypothesis.  The block design test is a subtest from the Wechsler Intelligence Scales (e.g., 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Wechsler, 2004) and requires participants to reproduce 
two-dimensional, red and white, geometric patterns using a set of three-dimensional cubes, 
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which have two red, two white, and two diagonally oriented half-red and half-white sides.  
Although there are a handful of contrary findings (e.g., Bölte, Holtman, Poustka, Scheurich, & 
Schmidt, 2007), it is generally accepted that individuals with ASD show superior performance 
on the block design test (e.g., Caron, Mottron, Berthiaume, & Dawson, 2006).  According to the 
weak central coherence hypothesis, this performance peak is attributable to the fact that 
individuals with ASD process the two-dimensional patterns in a piecemeal fashion, automatically 
focusing on the constituent parts of the design.   
 Support for this interpretation was provided in a landmark study by Shah and Frith 
(1993).  Both low- and high-functioning adolescents/young adults with autism were asked to 
complete two different versions of the block design task: the standard “un-segmented” version 
and a “pre-segmented” version in which the constituent blocks were shown spaced apart in the 
two-dimensional design to be copied.  It was found that participants with autism showed 
significantly superior performance (i.e., construction times were significantly faster) only in the 
un-segmented version of the task.  The authors argued that the pre-segmented version effectively 
eliminated the advantage that individuals with ASD had over typical individuals in the un-
segmented version by removing the global image and highlighting the constituent parts (already 
apparent to participants with ASD) to the non-autistic participants.  These findings have recently 
been replicated by Caron, Mottron, Berthiaume, and Dawson (2006) in a sample of high-
functioning adults with autism.  However, Kaland, Mortensen, and Smith (2007) reported no 
significant group differences in either segmented or un-segmented block design between high-
functioning adolescents with autism/Asperger’s syndrome and typical adolescents (matched on 
chronological age, VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ).   In fact, the ASD group was a little slower than the 
comparison group in each case.     
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Research using the Embedded Figures Test (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971) has 
also been cited in support of the weak central coherence hypothesis.  The task is to search for and 
identify a simple hidden target shape within a more complex picture (e.g., a triangle within a 
picture of a pram).  Shah and Frith (1983) found that low-functioning children with ASD 
achieved significantly higher accuracy on this task than age and non-verbal mental age matched 
comparison children with intellectual disability (55%) and non-verbal mental age matched 
typically developing children.  In a later study of high-functioning adults with autism or 
Asperger syndrome, Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1997) found that although all groups showed a 
similar level of accuracy, whilst typical participants took an average of 53 seconds to locate the 
hidden figures, participants with autism or Asperger syndrome (matched for age, VIQ, PIQ and 
FSIQ) took only 29 and 32 seconds, respectively.   
 Shah and Frith argued that individuals with ASD experience less “capture by meaning”.  
In other words, individuals with ASD are faster or more accurate on the task because they are 
unhindered by the overall global meaning of the picture (e.g., the fact that it is a picture of a 
pram).  Although a number of studies have replicated the finding that individuals with ASD 
outperform matched comparison individuals on the embedded figures test (Edgin & Pennington, 
2005; Jarrold, Gilchrist, & Bender, 2005; Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006), there 
have also been a number of contrary findings (Bölte, Holtman, Poustka, Scheurich, & Schmidt, 
2007; Morgan, Maybery, & Durkin, 2003; Schlooz et al., 2006; Kaland, Mortensen, & Smith, 
2007).   
Susceptibility to visual illusions is also thought to be mediated by central coherence.  
Happé (1996) found that low-functioning children with autism were less likely to succumb to 
visual illusions such as the Müller-Lyer figures and Kanisza triangle than comparison children 
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(matched for age and verbal IQ).  Confirming this finding, a recent study by Bölte, Holtman, 
Poustka, Scheurich, and Schmidt (2007) revealed that high-functioning adults with autism were 
less susceptible to visual illusions than typical comparison adults (matched on verbal IQ, 
performance IQ, and age).  Other studies have failed to find evidence for decreased susceptibility 
to visual illusions in ASD (Hoy, Hatton, & Hare, 2004; Ropar & Mitchell, 1999; Ropar & 
Mitchell, 2001).  However, each of the studies that obtained null results failed to include 
comparison groups that were closely matched on age and intellectual ability.  For example, in the 
Hoy et al. study, the autism group was younger and less verbally able than the comparison group.  
Indeed, the effect sizes for the differences between the autism and comparison groups on age 
(Cohen’s d = 1.05) and verbal mental age (Cohen’s d = 0.54) were large and moderate, 
respectively, indicating that the groups were not closely matched.  The validity of these findings 
is therefore questionable.   
Studies of homograph reading are another key source of evidence that is consistent with 
the weak central coherence hypothesis.  Homographs are words with one spelling but multiple 
pronunciations and meanings (e.g., “She had a pink bow.” versus “She made a deep bow.”).  In 
homograph reading tasks, participants are required to read aloud sentences that include 
homographs (e.g., “It was lead in the box that made it so heavy.”).  In such tasks, the correct 
pronunciation for the homograph can only be ascertained through considering the overall context 
of the sentence.  It has been consistently found that children (Frith & Snowling, 1983, 
Experiment 5), adolescents (Happé, 1997; López & Leekam, 2003), and adults (Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999, Experiment 1) with ASD are significantly more likely to mispronounce 
homographs, tending to adopt the most common pronunciation without taking into account the 
sentence context.  Frith and Snowling suggest that the tendency to mispronounce homographs in 
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context arises from using a word-by-word reading strategy – evidence for weak central 
coherence.   
By and large evidence from block design, embedded figures, visual illusions, and 
homograph reading is consistent with the idea that weak central coherence can result in either 
inferior or superior performance, depending upon the particular task demands.  Superior block 
design/embedded figures test performance and decreased susceptibility to visual illusions, 
alongside inferior homograph reading suggests that weak central coherence operates at both the 
perceptual and conceptual levels.   
Challenges to the weak central coherence account of ASD 
As is the case for impaired ToM and executive dysfunction, weak central coherence does 
not appear to be universal in ASD.  Teunisse, Cools, van Spaendonck, Aerts, and Berger (2001), 
for example, found that although weak central coherence was more common in ASD, it was not 
universally found – only 57% (20/35) of young adults with ASD showed this cognitive style.  On 
the other hand, Pellicano, Mayberry, Durkin, and Maley (2006) found that 92% of children with 
ASD were more than one standard deviation quicker than the mean of the matched comparison 
children on the embedded figures test.  There are also questions over the diagnostic specificity of 
weak central coherence to ASD.  For example, in their study of visual illusions, Bölte et al. 
(2007) found that adults with depression or schizophrenia were less susceptible to visual 
illusions than typical adults and did not significantly differ from participants with ASD in terms 
of level of susceptibility.   
Perhaps more importantly, the explanatory power of the weak central coherence 
hypothesis is rather limited.  At best, it is likely to explain only limited aspects of the behavioural 
phenotype.  Although few studies have empirically assessed the relationship between weak 
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central coherence and the clinical features of ASD, those that have generally fail to find 
significant relationships with either social impairments (Teunisse et al. 2001) or RRBIs (South et 
al. 2007).  This would seem to suggest that weak central coherence should be viewed as largely 
an explanation of non-triad features of ASD, which affect some individuals but not others.  
Intriguingly, however, research employing a non-clinical sample indicates a positive relationship 
between weak central coherence and levels of autistic-like traits (Stewart, Watson, Allcock, & 
Yaqoob, 2009).  
Alternative explanations for weak central coherence “effects”  
One of the main limitations of the weak central coherence account is that it remains 
largely descriptive – no specific cognitive or neural mechanisms for local bias are posited.  
Alternative accounts for weak central coherence “effects” have gone some way towards 
specifying the underlying mechanisms responsible.   
The enhanced perceptual functioning theory (Mottron & Burack, 2001; Mottron, 
Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006) is the probably the most influential alternative 
explanation for weak central coherence “effects”.  According to this theory, individuals with 
ASD do not show deficits in global processing or a bias towards local processing (as suggested 
by the weak central coherence account) but, rather, show enhanced perceptual processing, which 
results in a local bias.  Here, perception is broadly defined and is said to range from “feature 
detection up to and including pattern recognition” (Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & 
Burack, 2006, p.28).   
 In terms of their neurobiological basis, Brock, Brown, Boucher, and Rippon (2002) have 
hypothesized that weak central coherence effects in ASD are underpinned by a deficit in 
temporal binding.  Thus, the brain activity of individuals with ASD is characterized by 
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diminished temporal synchronization of neuronal activity between functionally specialized local 
neural networks.  Brock et al. argue that individuals with ASD therefore show diminished 
performance on experimental tasks that require the integration of information from different 
functionally specialized local networks but undiminished performance on tasks that depends only 
upon isolated local networks.  In a similar vein, Just, Cherkassky, Keller, and Minshew (2004) 
propose that underconnectivity – diminished coordination and communication – between brain 
regions underlies weak central coherence effects.  Like the temporal binding hypothesis, the 
underconnectivity hypothesis also predicts that individuals with ASD should perform well when 
tasks do not require coordination of disparate cortical regions but poorly when tasks depend upon 
the multiple cortical regions.  Data from a number of fMRI studies do seem to suggest reduced 
functional connectivity in ASD (Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, 
& Minshew, 2004). 
The Future of Psychological Theories of ASD: Multiple or Single Deficit Accounts and the 
Possible Fractionation of the Triad 
Cognitive theories of ASD have generally attempted (with varying degrees of success) to 
identify a single primary cognitive deficit as the causal factor underlying the complete triad of 
behavioural impairments that characterize ASD.  However, it is becoming clear that, standing 
alone, none of the existing cognitive theories (the most influential of which have been described 
above) provide a satisfactory explanation for the full range of behavioural deficits seen in ASD.  
For this reason, the trend towards multiple deficit accounts is now gaining momentum (Bishop, 
1989; Boucher, 2006; Goodman, 1989; Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006).  Researchers have also 
begun to question whether the domains of the triad of impairments are separable.  If they are 
separable, then arguably we already have adequate theoretical explanations for the individual 
Behavioural, Biopsychosocial, and Cognitive Models of Autism Spectrum Disorders 32 
triad domains.  For example, Happé and Ronald (2008) suggest that whilst ToM impairments 
may account for social and communication impairments, executive dysfunction may account for 
RRBIs.  On the other hand, if the triad of impairments is not fractionable, it is clear that we have 
a lot of theory building left to do.  Clearly then, the future of psychological models of ASD will 
critically depend on the outcome of research investigating the relations amongst the triad of 
impairments.   
The earliest study to address this question was conducted by Wing and Gould (1979).  
They selected a sample of 132 children from a “psychiatric and mental retardation register”, who 
had severe intellectual disability (mental retardation) or one or more of the following clinical 
features: (a) impairment of social interaction; (b) impairment of verbal and nonverbal 
communication; (c) repetitive, stereotyped activities.  On the basis of clinical assessments, Wing 
and Gould established that impairments in each domain tended cluster together within 
individuals.  For example, of the 74 children with social impairment, 55% had no speech, and 
72% showed RRBIs.  However, we can only draw limited conclusions from these findings, given 
that definitions and criteria for ASD have changed so significantly since 1979 (Happé & Ronald, 
2008).  Another notable disadvantage of this study is that the sample was drawn from a register 
of psychiatric patients – a population that is likely to show higher rates of co-morbidity (e.g., 
between each domain of the triad) than community samples.  This sampling method may 
therefore artificially elevate the number of individuals in the sample who have impairments 
across multiple domains (Caron & Rutter, 1991). 
More recent research has overcome this limitation by employing population based 
community samples and “bottom-up” factor analytic techniques.  This type of research takes a 
dimensional rather than categorical approach to the ASD triad and assumes that autistic-like 
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traits within each of the triad domains vary continuously in the general population (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001; Constantino & Todd, 2003).  Here, sub-
clinical levels of autistic-like traits are referred to as the “broader autism phenotype”.  Using this 
type of approach, Constantino et al. (2000) assessed 287 school-aged typically developing 
children and 158 child psychiatric patients using the Social Reciprocity Scale (SRS) (now 
referred to as the “Social Responsiveness Scale”; Constantino, 2002) – a 65 item, parent/teacher-
rated quantitative scale, measuring autistic-like traits.  A factor analysis revealed that a single 
factor (rather than three factors as would be expected if the triad is fractionable) explained 70% 
of the variance in SRS scores.   
However, studies using other measures of autistic-like traits have generally found 
multiple factor solutions, ranging from 2 to 8 factors (Auyeung, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & 
Allison, 2005; see Happé & Ronald, 2008, for a review; Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, & Boomsma, 
2008).  For example, Austin (2005) assessed 201 undergraduate students using the Autism-
spectrum Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) – a 50 
item self-report questionnaire – and found that a three factor model explained 28% of the 
variance in scores.  These finding were closely replicated in a recent study of 1005 psychology 
undergraduate students (Hurst, Mitchell, Kimbrel, Kwapil, & Nelson-Gray, 2007).  However, it 
should be noted that each of these studies used an oblique rotation method, which allows factors 
to be correlated.  Neither study reported the inter-factor correlations, making it difficult to judge 
the degree of independence amongst the factors.  A recent study by Stewart and Austin (2009) 
employing a sample of 536 university students, reported a four factor solution, accounting for 
29% of the variance in AQ scores.  These factors were labeled as follows: (1) Socialness, (2) 
Patterns, (3) Understanding Others/Communication, and (4) Imagination.  The correlations 
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between each pair of factors ranged from .00 to .22, with the highest correlation being between 
socialness and understanding others/communication.   
Clearly, there is a great deal of variation in results both within and between the different 
types of measure of autistic traits.  Overall, these findings call into question the notion of a triad 
of domains of autistic-like impairments in the general population, with the majority of studies 
suggesting either fewer or a greater number of domains.  What is also unclear is the degree to 
which these domains are correlated with one another.  Studies of clinical populations provide 
equally variable results, with some studies suggesting a single factor (e.g., Constantino et al., 
2004; Szatmari et al., 2002) and others suggesting multiple factors (e.g., Dworzynski, Happé, 
Bolton, & Ronald, 2009; Mandy & Skuse, 2008).  One point to bear in mind when considering 
the results of these studies is that factor structure may be an artifact of the particular measure 
used rather than a reflection of any objectively independent causal factors.  
The question of whether or not ASD involves a triad of independent impairments is yet to 
be definitively answered.  Undoubtedly, there will be an intensive research effort to this end in 
the coming years.  This research will have clear implications for psychological accounts of ASD, 
which will need to be refined according to the outcome of this research effort.  Equally, a better 
understanding of the cognitive basis/bases of ASD could help to shape our understanding of the 
etiology of the disorder.  For example, Bishop (e.g., 2006) has argued that one way for genetic 
studies to circumvent the difficulties associated with defining the behavioural phenotype is to 
“cut loose from conventional clinical criteria for diagnosing disorders and to focus instead on 
measures of underlying cognitive mechanisms. Psychology can inform genetics by clarifying 
what the key dimensions are for heritable phenotypes” (p.1153).  By developing a finer-grained 
understanding of cognition in ASD, it might be possible to focus down on a set of genes that are 
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reliably associated with a specific cognitive endophenotype in ASD (as has been done in other 
disorders; e.g., SLI Consortium, 2004).  Vice versa, such genetic studies may also clarify the 
nature of cognition in developmental disorders like ASD (e.g., Bishop et al., 1999).  Either way, 
we believe that a complete account of ASD will require an understanding of the cognitive 
underpinnings of the disorder.   
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